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Reliability and Blackouts

Jump to: Blackouts; August 2003 Blackout; Role of Energy Policy Act of 2005; or Future

“Without electrical power, urban life would cease to exist, the information age would become a faded memory, and industrial production would grind to a halt. The fastest way to ensure the collapse of the modern era would be to pull the plug and turn off the flow of electricity. Light, heat, and power would all stop. Civilization as we know it would come to an end.”

-- Jeremy Rifkin, The Hydrogen Economy, 2002 [1]

Over the last century, consumer expectations of reliable electric service have increased. Outages which once were common place are now considered unacceptable due to the fact that interruptions may now impact millions of electricity customers, computers, and other electronic devices [2]. The August 2003 Blackout served to further prove an already well-known fact: a reliable supply of electricity is more than just a convenience, it is a necessity; the global economy and world’s very way of life depend on it [3].

Ensuring reliability of the electric power system is a particularly challenging task for electric companies; maintaining a high level of reliability requires constant commitment [3]. Providing reliable electricity involves real-time assessment, control, and coordination of electricity production at thousands of generators, moving electricity across and interconnected network of transmission lines, and ultimately delivering the electricity to millions of customers by means of a distribution network [4]. Reliability means the uninterrupted monitoring of diverse issues such as load forecasts; fuel supply, delivery, and transportation; political and communal stance on the construction of new generating capacity; electrical and mechanical status of operating equipment; future and present planning; and a number of other various issues [2].

According to the joint US-Canada Report on the August 14th, 2003 Blackout, reliable operation of the power grid is complex and demanding for two fundamental reasons: (1) electricity flows at close to the speed of light (186,000 miles per second) and is not economically storable in large quantities; and (2) without the use of control devices which are too expensive for general use, the flow of alternating current (AC) electricity cannot be controlled like a liquid or gas by opening or closing a valve in a pipe – electricity flows freely along all available paths from the generators to the loads in accordance with the laws of physics. Thus, maintaining reliability is a complex enterprise that requires trained and skilled operators, sophisticated computers and communications, and careful planning and design [4].

Preventing outages and blackouts is of utmost concern to the nation and the world. Some estimates claim that the costs of electric power outages are $26 billion each year in the US alone and have been increasing as the electric power industry is restructured [2]. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) estimates that power outages and insufficient power quality cost the US economy over $119 billion per year [2, 5]. Not enough effort is put towards ensuring reliability; some argue that US electric reliability improvements have lagged behind other improvements, such as efficiency and conservation, and this lagging has compounded the occurrence of blackouts [6].

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) is a non-governmental entity whose mission is to improve the reliability and security of the bulk power system in North America. To achieve that, NERC develops and enforces reliability standards; monitors the bulk power system; assesses future adequacy; audits owners, operators, and users for preparedness; and educates and trains industry personnel. NERC is a self-regulatory organization that relies on the diverse and collective expertise of industry participants. As the Electric Reliability Organization, NERC is subject to audit by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and governmental authorities in Canada [7].

NERC and its eight Regional Reliability Councils have developed system operating and planning standards for ensuring the reliability of a transmission grid. These standards are based on seven key concepts: (1) balance power generation and demand continuously; (2) balance reactive power supply and demand to maintain scheduled voltages; (3) monitor flows over transmission lines and other facilities to ensure that thermal limits are not exceeded; (4) keep the system in stable condition; (5) operate the system so that it remains in reliable condition even if a contingency occurs; (6) plan, design, and maintain the system to operate reliably; and (7) prepare for emergencies [4].

Casazza and Delea (2003) argue that to ensure electric reliability, the electricity industry must develop all plans in a multidimensional nature. Specifically, it is essential that the electric industry: (1) plan the electrical system to have enough generation, transmission, and distribution capacity; (2) design the system to reduce the probability of equipment failure; (3) operate the system to remain within safe operating margins; and (4) be prepared to restore the system quickly, in the event of a supply disruption [2].

Blackouts

The US electrical power grid has experienced serious power failures on a number of occasions over the past forty years, each one creating panic and a warning of what may happen if blackouts become more frequent [1]. Interruptions in the supply of electricity to customers have been caused by disturbances to or malfunctions of the generation, transmission, and/or distribution of electricity [2]. Most power outages are cause by weather-related events, minor disturbances to the local distribution system (such as a car striking a distribution pole), or may be planned controlled or rotating outages to compensate for insufficient generation resources [2, 8]. On other occasions, massive power outages – or blackouts – can be caused by reliability issues.

Even minor occurrences in the electric power grid can sometimes lead to catastrophic “cascading” blackouts. The loss of a single generator can result in an imbalance between load and generation, altering many flows in the electricity network. If there is a loss of generation within an area and there is not enough internal generation then the area transmission lines need to have enough capacity to transfer energy to supply the load and maintain acceptable system parameters. If the transmission ties do not have enough capacity, then the system reliability and security are at risk [9].

A "cascade" can occur on a power system if the balance between load, generation and transmission system flows is disrupted when one or more elements of the electrical grid (generator or transmission line) fails or trips out of service. When an element trips, existing power flows are instantaneously redistributed onto other elements of the grid according to the laws of physics, irrespective of state boundaries or ownership of the transmission facilities [9].

Many experts argue that technical issues are not the only player; that part of the reliability problem is energy deregulation itself, coupled with the end of guaranteed return on investment (ROI) [6]. In short, simple desire to make a profit may be fueling the occurrences of electric blackouts.

Cascading blackouts are particularly damaging in today’s networked world; they seriously disrupt the nation’s information superhighway [1]. To compound the dilemma, in recent years, the increased deployment of personal computers has had the effect of putting additional stresses on the power grid in the US and other countries, making electricity shortages more likely in the future. The overall demand for digital power is increasing even faster than the greater efficiencies that are coming on line [1].

Major blackouts are more common than the US electricity industry would like to admit. Major North American blackouts occurred in 1965 and 1977; the interconnected electric grid covering nine western states collapsed twice in the summer of 1996; in 1999, the northeast experiences outages stemming from a heat wave and equipment failures; California experienced rolling blackouts in 2000 and 2001; and in 2003, the nation experienced the largest blackout in its history [6].

August 2003 Blackout

On August 14, 2003, large portions of the Midwest and Northeast United States, and Ontario, Canada – including New York City and Toronto, two large urban centers that are heavily industrialized and important financial centers – experienced an electric power blackout [4, 10]. The outage affected an area with an estimated 50 million people and 61,800 MW of electric load [4]. Nearly half the Canadian economy is located in Ontario and was affected by the blackout [10]. In some parts of the US, power was not restored for 4 days.

Previous major North American blackouts (one in 1965 and one in 1977), and the 2000-2001 California Electricity Crisis, produced a sizable library of studies and analysis of the direct and indirect economic costs of power outages on regional economies. These events and studies were used to estimate the total costs of the 2003 Blackout to be between $4 billion and $10 billion dollars [4, 10, 11]. The loses include estimates of direct costs per kWh of the power outage (e.g., losses due to food spoilage, lost production, and overtime wages) and indirect costs due to the secondary effects of the direct costs [10].

Examples of direct impacts of the 2003 Blackout on specific industries are widespread, including: 70 automotive and vehicle parts plants which were shut down, idling over 100,000 workers; 8 oil refineries in the US and Canada which were affected though the loss of production; and over 30 chemical, petrochemical, and oil refining facilities which suffered some form of outage resulting in the flaring of products at most of the facilities (leading to massive clouds of black smoke visible throughout the area) [10].

After considerable analysis, multiple parties concluded that the 2003 Blackout began in Ohio and was the direct result of seven specific violations of NERC reliability policies, guidelines, and standards. According to the joint US-Canada Report on the August 14th, 2003 Blackout: “The Ohio phase of the August 14, 2003, blackout was caused by deficiencies in specific practices, equipment, and human decisions by various organizations that affected conditions and outcomes that afternoon – for example, insufficient reactive power was an issue in the blackout, but it was not a cause in itself. Rather, deficiencies in corporate policies, lack of adherence to industry policies, and inadequate management of reactive power and voltage caused the blackout, rather than the lack of reactive power” [4].

The report continues to identify four groups of causes of the blackout: (1) FirstEnergy (FE) and the East Central Area Reliability Council (ECAR) failed to assess and understand the inadequacies of FE’s system, particularly with respect to voltage instability and the vulnerability of the Cleveland-Akron area, and FE did not operate its system with appropriate voltage criteria; (2) FE did not recognize or understand the deteriorating condition of its system; (3) FE failed to manage adequately tree growth in its transmission rights-of-way; and (4) there was an overall failure of the interconnected grid’s reliability organizations to provide effective real-time diagnostic support [4].

Problems also existed in the fact that NERC standards and processes were inadequate because they did not give sufficiently clear direction to industry members concerning some preventive measures needed to maintain reliability, and that NERC does not have the authority to enforce compliance with the standards [4].

Thus, the August 2003 Blackout was not caused by one single entity, but by a vast array of entities, each of which failed to uphold one or more standards designed to ensure a reliable flow of electricity. This fact fortifies the aforementioned notion that ensuring the reliability of any electric grid is a very difficult task. The required coordination is complex and multilateral, sometimes leading to overlapping or neglecting of duties. It is hoped that lessons will be learned from the analysis of the August 2003 Blackout and these lessons will shape future reliability policy aimed at ensuring such catastrophic outages become a thing of the past.

Role of Energy Policy Act of 2005

After the major blackouts of 1965, the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) was created to provide guidelines to prevent a recurrence of such a blackout [6]. The main purpose of NERC was to ensure that every region had sufficient "reserves" (sufficient "extra generation" instantly available) to make sure the system could tolerate the loss of any single piece of equipment without disruption at any time, and in many cases to sustain the loss of more than one piece of equipment. It also adopted rules that diversified these reserves sufficiently throughout the system to make sure that no major transmission problems would occur [9]. In the wake of the Blackout of 2003, NERC’s powers were significantly expanded by the Energy Policy Act of 2005.

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) (Full Act: Pub.L. 109-058; Summary: Research Service) addressed reliability issues in a number of ways. First, EPAct mandated the creation of a self-regulatory Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) that spans North America, with oversight by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). In 2006, FERC certified NERC as the ERO for the United States [12]. As the ERO, NERC is responsible for establishing and enforcing FERC-approved electric reliability standards [13]. Furthermore, Mexican and Canadian authorities have promised to back NERC’s regulations with the force of law [14].

Second, EPAct mandates that the Department of Energy (DOE) conduct a study of electric transmission congestion every three years and gives the DOE authority to designate “national interest electric transmission corridors,” which will receive special attention and funding to ensure reliability is upheld [13, 15]. The corridors are established based on the level of electric congestion in the area, the economic vitality of development of the corridor, end markets served by the corridor, and prices of electricity resulting from any electricity congestion. FERC then has the authority to issue permits for the construction of transmission facilities in the corridor (if it determines that the host state does not have the authority to approve the siting). Recognizing the importance of electric reliability, EPAct grants the ERO and FERC power to acquire right-of-way by the exercise of right of eminent domain for siting transmission expansion [13, 15].

Furthermore, EPAct mandates the adoption of IEEE 1574 Standard for Interconnecting Distributed Resources with Electric Power Systems. IEEE 1574 is a “technology-neutral” standard which does not specify specific types of equipment needed to meet interconnection requirements. Instead, the standard focuses on ensuring the ability for interconnection of any on-site facility. In doing so, it addresses both operational and safety issues while focusing on the functional requirements of the interconnection and not on the specific types of equipment to meet the functional requirements. The standard will increase the diversity of the electricity supply by facilitating development of fuel cells, photovoltaics and other distributed energy generation technologies, and help ensure the reliability and safety of the nation’s electric power system for decades to come [16].

Future

It is recognized that a complete elimination of blackouts is likely not possible in the foreseeable future. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers – United States of America (IEEE-USA) recommends three specific areas which must be addressed to ensure that blackouts occur as infrequently as possible [9]. First, the industry must focus resources on methods of prevention though grid investment, enhanced grid operation techniques, and integrated grid coordination. Second, the industry must limit the extent of failures. This can be done by redesigning large synchronous grids to break apart, under emergency conditions, into viable, survivable electric sub-grids; by planning the emergency use of distributed generation resources; and by recognizing the opportunity that consumer loads can contribute to the enhancement of system reliability. Third, the industry must set and enhance protocols and procedures for recovery from failures. This will require new ways of thinking, new engineering design, and innovation [9].

The provisions in EPAct and the vast array of actions voluntarily taken by parties throughout the nation will help to ensure a brighter future of the US electric grid. Yet, many challenges still remain which threaten the reliability of the grid. It is more important today than ever that methods to uphold reliability and reduce the occurrences of blackouts be deployed, and that everyone – from a residential consumer, to the nation’s largest electric utility – play their role in ensuring a secure supply of electricity for all.

IEEE-USA argues that the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) could make significant contributions to energy policy debates by communicating its expertise to Congress. According to Dr. Thomas R. Schneider, a former IEEE-USA Congressional Fellow and a Power Engineering Society member since 1973, “electrical engineers have not been as effective as some (of those in) other professions in articulating their positions in terms understandable by Congress. The IEEE and the Power Engineering Society need to redouble efforts in this area, not only to help Congress understand blackouts, but also to help legislators make the decisions that will shape the future of electric power over the next decade. The consequences of not making the necessary effort will be continued marginalization of electric power engineers in congressional debates and a further decline in the reliability of our electric power infrastructure” [17].

Furthermore, there is a pressing need for legislators in Washington to have a technical background – or at least be more educated on technical issues. Efforts have been made (such as the Blackout 101 Forum sponsored by the IEEE Power Engineering Society and the IEEE-USA Energy Policy Committee) to educate Congress on issues surrounding electric reliability, but such forums are only the first step; significantly more technical knowledge must be passed to policy makers to ensure that policy is formulated in a manner to ensure electric reliability in the years to come.